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This Essay investigates Chicago city-government policy responses to the four
largest homicide waves in its history: 1920–1925, 1966–1970, 1987–1992, and 2016.
Through spatial and historical methods, we discover that Chicago police and the
mayor’s office misused data to advance agendas conceived prior to the start of the
homicide waves. Specifically, in collaboration with mayors, the Chicago Police Department leveraged its monopoly over crime data to influence public narratives over
homicide in ways that repeatedly (1) delegitimized Black social movements, (2) expanded policing, (3) framed homicide as an individual rather than systemic problem, and (4) exclusively credited police for homicide rate decreases. These findings
suggest that efforts to improve violence-prevention policy in Chicago require not only
a science of prevention and community flourishing but also efforts to democratize
how the city uses data to define and explain homicide.

German sociologist Max Weber famously described the modern state as unique because of its monopoly over the legitimate
use of violence. 1 Many of Chicago’s debates over police reform and
violence prevention involve efforts to transform this monopoly. To
move beyond a public-safety model that relies on police violence,
advocates and community groups have lobbied for alternative approaches. Despite periods of successful violence-prevention programming in Chicago history, alternatives to police have not been
institutionalized in city, county, or state government. As funding
for violence-prevention programs has waxed and waned, the Chicago Police Department (CPD) has seen consistent growth in its
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See generally MAX WEBER, POLITICS AS A VOCATION (1919), reprinted in THE VOCATION LECTURES 33 (David Owen & Tracy B. Strong eds., Rodney Livingstone trans., 2004).
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budget, funded through a combination of city taxes, federal
grants, and gifts from private donors. 2 How have the CPD and the
city of Chicago consistently warded off threats to their monopoly
over the provision of public safety? 3
Although previous research points to the importance of federal aid for the steady growth of city police departments since the
1960s, in this Essay we focus on an important yet understudied
topic—city responses to homicide waves. Sudden increases in violent crimes like homicide create legitimacy crises for police by
prompting increased scrutiny and attention on police departments
as citizen demand for public safety increases. We analyze how the
CPD and the mayor’s office responded to the legitimacy crises produced by Chicago’s four largest homicide waves from 1920 to the
present. The four waves took place from 1920 to 1925, from 1966
to 1970, from 1987 to 1992, and in 2016.
Our inductive analysis reveals that the CPD responded to
each wave by espousing racialized anti-Black explanations for
homicide increases that diverted responsibility away from the
mayor or police. Over time, the CPD has increasingly made use of
its monopoly on crime data to legitimize these “condemnation[s]
of Blackness.” 4 By “monopoly on data,” we do not mean the refusal
to share all data. Starting in the 2000s, the city and the CPD
publicly shared data on the time and place of crimes through the
city’s open data portal. Rather, when we refer to the police monopoly, we mean the exclusive possession of raw data and detailed
crime reports that inhibit researchers from fact-checking policedepartment analyses and claims about crime. The open data portal does not provide the data necessary for such fact-checking.
This gives the city and the CPD a monopolistic platform to define
and explain increases and decreases as they see fit, with little
social-scientific oversight.

See Robert Vargas & Philip McHarris, Race and State in City Police Spending
Growth: 1980 to 2010, 3 SOCIO. RACE & ETHNICITY 96, 100, 102, 108–09 (2017); cf. ELIZABETH
HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME: THE MAKING OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 76, 102, 113, 159, 257–59, 268–69 (2016).
3
While there is considerable overlap between the city and the CPD, when we refer
to the city, we are primarily talking about the response from the mayor’s office. When we
talk about the police, we are primarily referring to the police department’s response.
Though they work together, for purposes of this analysis, we discuss them as two separate
entities.
4
KHALIL GIBRAN MUHAMMAD, THE CONDEMNATION OF BLACKNESS: RACE, CRIME,
AND THE MAKING OF MODERN URBAN AMERICA 68 (2019).
2
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Findings revealed that during each wave the city and the
CPD represented homicide and its causes as rooted in Black communities presented as incapable of rehabilitation. More importantly, beginning in the 1960s, the city and the CPD used data
to delegitimize critics and organizations advocating for nonpunitive responses to homicide increases. Most recently, in 2016, the
city and the CPD leveraged their data monopoly even further to
constrain research on homicide by restricting the kinds of research questions that scholars can investigate with the police department’s raw data and detailed reports. Specifically, the CPD
accomplished this through data agreements—which researchers
must sign—that stipulate the CPD’s power not only to take away
a researcher’s data at any moment but also to refuse all future
requests from that researcher.
By selectively sharing data with the public and signing data
agreements that constrain researchers, the CPD continues to legitimize its existence—and advocate for its expansion—by keeping the public focused on deviant individual behavior rather than
systemic problems like state budget cuts, institutional racism,
and economic inequality. In addition, the CPD has used its monopoly to pin responsibility for the homicide increase on nonpunitive social-service programming and Black social movements. By
capitalizing on the crises brought by homicide waves, the city and
the CPD have emerged from each homicide wave with more funding for police officers and surveillance technologies.
Our findings have two overarching implications. First, social
scientists and journalists need to more rigorously question both
the mayor and the CPD about their uses of data when those entities describe and justify responses to homicide waves. Second, our
analysis indicates that, in Chicago, associating criminality with
Blackness has been extremely effective when pushing for increased police funding, police hires, and new police technology
over the last fifty years. Efforts to reform policing—or outsource
violence prevention to nonprofits—cannot significantly advance
without simultaneous efforts to democratize crime-data access
and resist city efforts to capitalize on racialized public anxiety
over homicide.
I. METHODS
To describe the characteristics of each homicide wave, we analyzed homicide rates by community area during the time periods
when Chicago experienced the steepest homicide increases
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between 1890 and 2016. We chose community areas because they
were the only geographic unit of analysis consistent across each
time period. Community areas also had the advantage of having
population counts across each of these time periods. We used linear
interpolation to fill in data for years between decennial censuses.
To produce community-area homicide rates at each period,
we leveraged multiple data sources. For the 1920–1925 homicide
wave, we aggregated geocoded homicide data from Northwestern
University’s Chicago Historical Homicide Project. 5 For the 1966–
1970 and 1987–1992 waves, we used Carolyn Rebecca Block and
Professor Richard Block’s Homicides in Chicago, 1965-1995. 6 Finally, for 2016, we used data from the city of Chicago’s data portal. 7 All datasets are publicly available. Our code and data are
available upon request. We analyzed community-area-level homicide rates by grouping them into deciles for each year of each
homicide wave.
Our archival research for the 1920s relied primarily on
JSTOR’s historical-newspaper archive as well as historical books
and academic articles on the period. We used keyword Boolean
searches involving terms such as “police,” “crime,” “bootlegging,”
“race,” and “Black Belt” to identify relevant sources. For historical
figures like Mayor William Dever and Mayor Bill Thompson, we
identified biographical pieces and articles devoted specifically to
their tenures. Historical newspapers provided additional insight
into less-prominent actors who were important voices in shaping
the homicide narratives that dominated each period. We also used
academic articles and books on crime in Chicago as supplementary
material. Because of widespread historical interest in Al Capone
and bootlegging, the scholarly literature on crime during this
period is much larger than the corresponding literature on political actors.
Our archival research for the 1960s relied primarily on
ProQuest’s newspaper database of the Chicago Tribune and the Chicago Defender as well as secondary histories on Mayor Richard J.
Daley and the civil rights movement in this time period. For the
newspaper database, we used Boolean searches for terms such as
Leigh B. Bienen, Juana Haskin, Dennis Glenn & Mark Swindle, Homicide in Chicago 1870-1930, CHI. HIST. HOMICIDE PROJECT AT NW. UNIV. (last updated July 3, 2019),
available at https://perma.cc/9Y3S-P57V.
6
Carolyn Rebecca Block & Richard L. Block, Homicides in Chicago, 1965-1995,
NAT’L ARCHIVE OF CRIM. JUST. DATA, available at https://perma.cc/J42U-JF9T.
7
City of Chi., Crimes - 2016, CHI. DATA PORTAL, https://perma.cc/BQV3-KXTF.
5
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“police,” “Mayor Daley,” “Wilson,” “homicide,” “murder,” and
“crime.”
Our archival research for the 1980s relied primarily on
ProQuest’s newspaper database of the Chicago Tribune along
with Access World News’ database of the Chicago Sun-Times and
the Chicago Metro News. Similar search terms to the 1960s were
used, with “Wilson” being changed to “Martin.” 8
We identified archival material for 2016 using a very similar
process of leveraging books, newspaper articles, academic articles, and media coverage such as press conferences, recorded
news segments about crime, and television interviews with city
leaders about homicide. An especially useful resource for understanding the city’s response in 2016 was the annual police reports
from the CPD, which detailed personnel changes, new programs,
and responses to crime.
II. FINDINGS
The time-series graph of Chicago’s homicide rate from 1890
to 2019, shown in Figure 1, illuminates the four largest waves,
which occurred in 1920–1925, 1966–1970, 1987–1992, and the
year 2016. We define a homicide spike as any time period in which
homicide rates substantially increase. The magnitude of each
homicide wave increased over time, with a 0.534 jump in the homicide rate (homicides per 100,000 Chicago residents) during
Wave 1, a 0.624 jump in Wave 2, a 0.868 jump in Wave 3, and a
massive 10.444 jump in Wave 4.

8
O.W. Wilson was the CPD’s superintendent of police from 1960 to 1967. LeRoy
Martin was superintendent of police from 1987 to 1992.
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FIGURE 1: TIME-SERIES GRAPH OF CHICAGO HOMICIDE RATE
SINCE 1890

The highest homicide rates have been consistently concentrated
in the South Side, with the exception of high homicide rates downtown during Waves 1 and 2. The communities most affected during each homicide wave have been located in predominantly
Black, low-income areas.
A. Violent Suppression and Racializing Crime, 1920–1925
Figure 2 reveals that the Loop and Near South Side bore the
brunt of Chicago’s 1920–1925 homicide wave. These community
areas maintained the highest homicide rates throughout the sixyear wave, which peaked in 1924 and 1925. Bootlegging and control over alcohol due to prohibition were so intense that they related to 40% of all reported homicides between 1919 and 1933. 9

9
John J. Binder & Mars Eghigian Jr., Gangland Killings in Chicago, 1919-1933, 29
J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 219, 220 (2013).
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FIGURE 2: COMMUNITY-AREA HOMICIDE RATE
BY DECILE, 1920–1925

During this time period, the Loop was a predominantly White
area undergoing rapid building construction and improvement in
services. 10 The Near South Side was similarly characterized by
development, with major infrastructure on the lakeshore and the
construction of several public buildings, including the Field Museum, Soldier Field, Adler Planetarium, and Shedd Aquarium.11
Meanwhile, Douglas (known as the Black Metropolis) was home
to the “center for African-American business and political power
nationally.” 12 Armour Square was one-quarter Black, and would
grow to be one-half Black by the middle of the century as a result

GLEN E. HOLT & DOMINIC A. PACYGA, CHI. HIST. SOC’Y, CHICAGO: A HISTORICAL
GUIDE TO THE NEIGHBORHOODS: THE LOOP AND SOUTH SIDE 20–22 (1979); see also A Century
of Change in Chicago’s Demographics, CHI. AGENT MAG., https://perma.cc/G4VN-JHUN.
11 HOLT & PACYGA, supra note 10, at 18–26.
12 Christopher R. Reed, CA35—Douglas, in LOCAL COMMUNITY FACT BOOK: CHICAGO
METROPOLITAN AREA 1990, at 122 (The Chi. Fact Book Consortium ed., 1995).
10
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of the Great Migration. 13 The area was beginning to see an influx
of Chinese residents as well. 14
The first three years of the homicide wave occurred under the
leadership of Mayor William Thompson, who is often referred to
as the most corrupt mayor in Chicago history due to his ties to
organized crime and his police chief’s turning a blind eye to illegal
gambling and alcohol rackets. 15 During this time, partnerships
between law enforcement, politicians, and gangs throughout the
city were strong and not especially secretive. 16 Close ties with the
mayor generally ensured that law enforcement would not interfere with or arrest an individual for criminal activity. 17 Newspaper archives from 1920–1922 seldom mention any increase in violence, crime, or homicide. We found no evidence that Thompson
even acknowledged homicide as a problem.
Corruption under Thompson reached a boiling point when his
chief of police was indicted and a notebook belonging to a police
lieutenant was found that identified hotels and gambling houses
that should not be raided. 18 Perhaps the most sobering instance of
corruption occurred with the murder of a district attorney who
was in the company of individuals he had previously failed to convict. 19 The 1920s ignited an unprecedented movement for political
reform. To avoid getting displaced by that movement, Thompson
declined to run for reelection in 1923, opening the door for the
election of William Dever, a reformer who promised to vigorously
enforce prohibition.
Once in office, Dever kept his promise to enforce prohibition,
with his administration even threatening law-enforcement officers with suspension if they did not enforce it. 20 Dever ramped up
patrols, arrests, and license revocations against crime
13 M.W.H. & Will Hogan, CA34—Armour Square, in LOCAL COMMUNITY FACT BOOK:
CHICAGO METROPOLITAN AREA 1990, supra note 12, at 120, 120.
14 Id.
15 See Mark H. Haller, Police Reform in Chicago, 13 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 649, 654–
55 (1970); The Most Corrupt Public Official in Illinois History: William Hale Thompson,
NBC 5 CHI. (Jan. 25, 2012), https://perma.cc/22M9-GCBB.
16 See Mark H. Haller, Historical Roots of Police Behavior: Chicago, 1890-1925, 10
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 303, 315–17 (1976); see also Joseph Spillane, The Making of an Underground Market: Drug Selling in Chicago, 1900–1940, 32 J. SOC. HIST. 27, 37 (1998).
17 See Spillane, supra note 16, at 37; see also Haller, supra note 16, at 306–08 (describing the control that the mayor’s office and other politicians had over the police force).
18 Haller, supra note 15, at 654.
19 June Sawyers, Who, Everyone Wanted to Know, Killed McSwiggin?, CHI. TRIB.
(Nov. 27, 1988), https://perma.cc/T8KS-EX2E; DOUGLAS BUKOWSKI, BIG BILL THOMPSON,
CHICAGO, AND THE POLITICS OF IMAGE 203 (1998).
20 Haller, supra note 15, at 655.
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organizations throughout the city 21 and executed a massive initiative to arrest suspected criminals. 22 Dever also shut bootleggers
and organized-crime entities out of their transactions with city
hall, politicians, and law enforcement. 23
Despite these efforts, homicide rates in Chicago only worsened under the Dever administration. Before Dever took office in
1923, there were 9 homicides related to bootlegging and twenty
homicides related to organized crime between the years of 1919
and 1922. 24 By comparison, 153 homicides related to organized
crime occurred during Dever’s tenure as mayor between 1923 and
1927. 25 Dever’s tough-on-crime approach made him unpopular
with organized-crime figures like Al Capone. This set the stage
for a hard-fought 1927 mayoral election; with the support of organized crime and corrupt city officials, ex-mayor Thompson sought
reelection. 26
As the 1927 election approached, Dever transformed his response to homicide into a racialized reelection campaign. In addition to referring to Black saloons as magnets for crime, Dever’s
campaign went so far as to claim that the existence of such saloons was responsible for the 1919 race riots. 27 In speeches and
correspondence leading up to the 1927 election, Dever’s campaign
began to invoke “Black criminality” as justification for demanding
more resources for law enforcement. 28 For example, despite the
presence of alcohol sales and consumption throughout Chicago as
well as the high prevalence of homicide in the predominantly
White Loop, seven of the eight wards Dever targeted for increased
enforcement and arrests were in the Black Belt on Chicago’s
South Side. 29
In a strategy memo, Dever’s campaign sought to “appear in
the role of a Knight Errant who will save the citizens from a very

21

JAMES L. MERRINER, GRAFTERS AND GOO GOOS: CORRUPTION AND REFORM IN CHI-

CAGO, 1833–2003, at 111 (2004).

22 Fill Cells with Gangsters: Chief Leads Drive to Jail All Suspects, CHI. TRIB., Nov.
16, 1924, at 1.
23 See Mayor Closes 35 Saloons and Brewery “Mint”, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 30, 1923, at 6
(quoting Dever as saying that “[o]ur policy will be to hammer away along the same lines”).
24 Binder & Eghigian, supra note 9, at 222.
25 Id.
26 MERRINER, supra note 21, at 115–17.
27 THOMAS A. GUGLIELMO, WHITE ON ARRIVAL: ITALIANS, RACE, COLOR, AND POWER
IN CHICAGO, 1890–1945, at 99 (2003).
28 Id. at 98–100.
29 Spillane, supra note 16, at 40.
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real peril that even the most illiterate can understand.” 30 The
memo went on to state that Democrats should capitalize on the
fear that Black people were going to invade White neighborhoods
and cause property to depreciate. 31 In stoking White fear, the
Dever campaign posited the mayoral race as a choice between
Thompson, the candidate for Black invasion, and Dever, the defender of White families. 32 One Dever campaign slogan read:
“Negroes First—William Hale Thompson for Mayor.” 33 Other racist campaign tactics included: (1) distributing pamphlets with a
cartoon of Thompson ignoring a White child and kissing a Black
child and a slogan accusing Thompson of “talking America first,
but acting Africa First,” (2) posters asking “Is the Negro or the
White Man to Rule Chicago?”, (3) vehicles repeatedly playing
“Bye, Bye Blackbird” in the Loop, and (4) staging a fake Thompson
rally in the predominantly White Loop—Black Chicagoans were
invited to the rally to simulate a Black invasion. 34
In March 1927, Dever ordered police to raid the Black Belt—
shutting down Black businesses and making a new wave of arrests—stating that it was needed to curb crime. 35 In public, police
chief Morgan Collins cited Black criminality to explain the raids.
“[W]hite people did not dare stand on the sidewalks for fear that
they would be elbowed off,” Collins said. 36 “[A]n orgy of lawlessness has been promoted in the colored wards.” 37 Dever’s chief also
claimed that it was imperative to raid the Black Belt because
Black men were taking White girls to the South Side and engaging in racial mixing. 38 As the campaign waned, Dever and his
chief would justify continued raids by calling the Black Belt “a
disgrace to civilization” that required constant police activity

30 GUGLIELMO, supra note 27, at 99 (citing Memorandum, Equal Rights to All, Special Privileges to None. General Outlines of the Campaign 2 (c. March 1927) (on file at
Box 8, Folder 61, William E. Dever Mayoralty Papers, Chi. Hist. Soc’y) [hereinafter Dever
Campaign Memo]).
31 Id. (citing Dever Campaign Memo, supra note 30).
32 Id. (citing Dever Campaign Memo, supra note 30).
33 Id. at 100.
34 Id.
35 See Black Belt Raids Are Storm Center: Dever Defends, Thompson Men Assail Police, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 10, 1927, at 1; see also GUGLIELMO, supra note 30, at 99–100.
36 GUGLIELMO, supra note 30, at 100 (quoting Dever Defends Thompson Men Assail
Police, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 10, 1927, at 1).
37 Id. (quoting Delay Inquiry in Police Raids on South Side, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 11, 1927,
at 1).
38 Id. (quoting Thompson Men Fail to Press Cossack Charge: Council Group O. K.’s
Police Raids in Black Belt, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 25, 1927, at 7 [hereinafter Thompson Men])
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because Black people were prone to crime. 39 In the end, Dever’s
racist campaign failed. Thompson won the election of 1927 with
the help of Black voters. 40
A pattern in the city’s response to a homicide wave begins to
emerge here. When the public calls upon city leadership to improve public safety, punitive measures are introduced that disproportionately focus on Black communities.
B. Leveraging Data to Blame the Civil Rights Movement and
Expand Police Power, 1966–1970

Figure 3 shows the community areas where homicide was
most concentrated in the 1966–1970 wave. Homicide spiked in the
downtown, South Side, and West Side areas of Chicago. In the
first two years, Fuller Park was the community area with the

Id. (quoting Thompson Men, supra note 38).
Robert M. Lombardo, The Black Mafia: African-American Organized Crime in Chicago 1890–1960, 38 CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE 33, 44 (2002); see also MERRINER, supra
note 21, at 116.
39
40
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highest homicide rates, while the last three years of the wave saw
the Loop face the highest homicide rates.
The 1966–1970 homicide wave coincided with another period
of upheaval in Chicago as economic conditions, especially in Chicago’s Black neighborhoods, deteriorated precipitously. 41 Although
the CPD published data showing that homicide rates had been
increasing as early as 1964, 42 the homicide increase was not
framed as a major problem until late in the summer of 1966.
Then, the CPD leadership and Mayor Richard J. Daley framed
homicide as a problem of youth gangs, easy access to handguns,
and the perceived disorder stemming from civil rights demonstrations. 43 The mayor, working closely with the CPD, believed that the
proper policy response was a return to “law and order” through
more investments in policing and harsher criminal punishments. 44
The city’s initial response to the wave in 1966 and 1967 was
to double down on existing practices of aggressive policing and
surveillance of Black communities, advocating stricter gun-control
laws, and seeking expanded police powers. 45 As the homicide wave
persisted through the end of the decade, Daley—flanked by top
CPD brass and Cook County State’s Attorney Edward Hanrahan—
pushed for even more punitive measures to wage war on “gang
structures.” 46 This punitive push, led by the scandal-plagued and
violent Gang Intelligence Unit (GIU), became increasingly

41 See SIMON BALTO, OCCUPIED TERRITORY: POLICING BLACK CHICAGO FROM RED
SUMMER TO BLACK POWER 175–76 (2019).
42 OFF. OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, CITY OF CHI., CHICAGO POLICE STATISTICAL REPORT 1965, at 9 (1965).
43 See, e.g., O.W. Fearful of Record in Homicide, CHI. DAILY DEF., June 1, 1967, at 3;
Daley Makes Plea to City: ‘Must Protect Rights of Everyone’, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 20, 1966, at
A1; Crime Rates up Again, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 22, 1966, at 24; Chicago Crime Statistics:
Wilson Cites Gains in Homicides, Crime, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 5, 1967, at B11.
44 Mayor Richard J. Daley, Mayor Richard J. Daley Inaugural Address, 1967 (Apr.
20, 1967), in CHI. PUB. LIBR., https://perma.cc/87EL-KT39; cf. John Elmer, Daley Rips
Critics of Rights Gains, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 21, 1967, at A5; Robert Loerzel, Evolution of Chicago’s Handgun Ban, WBEZ CHI. (June 27, 2011), https://perma.cc/49RF-WAFJ.
45 See BALTO, supra note 4141, at 154–64, 175–79, 192–94; Wilson Seeks Tax Bill to
Assist Police, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 3, 1967, at B17; Try Again for State Law to Register All
Guns, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 23, 1967, at 7; Daley Asks Gun Law Support, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 7,
1967, at B2; Rise in Crime Due to Drouth, Wilson Says, CHI. TRIB., June 1, 1967, at 24;
Police Report Rise in Chicago Murders, CHI. TRIB., June 28, 1967, at C8.
46 Betty Reed, Gangs and Fair Housing, CHI. TRIB., May 29, 1969, at 24; see also
Donald Mosby, Metcalfe Urges Support for Fight Against Gangs, CHI. DAILY DEF., May 21,
1969, at 3; Pierre Guilmant, Through Eyes of Blacks See Hanrahan a Political Liability,
CHI. DAILY DEF., Dec. 8, 1969, at 2; Mayor Calls Parley Today on Violence, CHI. TRIB., May
26, 1969, at C11.
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focused on gang activity in Black neighborhoods. 47 This response
was driven by ever-increasing funding, manpower, and general
powers for the CPD, as its total personnel grew from around
13,000 to almost 16,000 and its budget more than doubled from
$90 million to $190 million from 1965 to 1970. 48
Community groups like the Woodlawn Organization (TWO)
and the Coalition for United Community Action (CUCA) sought
to address the homicide wave through community organizing for
anti-racism and job programs. 49 Daley, however, had no interest
in such community organizing, especially when gangs and gang
members participated. Crucially, the Daley administration
treated community efforts to address the homicide wave with the
same disdain, whether such efforts came from social-movement
and war-on-poverty organizations or from gangs. 50
In 1967, the city formed the GIU, whose then-leader, Officer
Edward Buckney, bluntly admitted that the GIU was “not concerned with sociological approaches.” 51 In fact, GIU officers often
intentionally inflamed conflicts between gangs and actively disrupted gang-affiliated efforts to bring job placement and training
to their neighborhoods. 52 While city hall was at least nominally
willing to support jobs programs for young people—provided that
they were strictly under the control of city hall—it vehemently
resisted attempts to work with gangs and instead viewed gangrelated homicides as a criminal problem that could only be solved
with more punitive policies. 53
See BALTO, supra note 41, at 201–04.
Id. at 164.
49 See id. at 177–78.
50 See NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE PROMISED LAND: THE GREAT BLACK MIGRATION AND
HOW IT CHANGED AMERICA 177–78, 244–45 (1992); see also BALTO, supra note 41, at 201–
02 (describing how the Daley administration and the GIU sought to sabotage communityimprovement organizations in which gangs participated).
51 BALTO, supra note 41, at 202 (quoting James Alan McPherson, Chicago’s Blackstone Rangers (Part I), THE ATLANTIC (May 1969), https://perma.cc/2DYV-YHMV).
52 See id. at 177–79, 201–04.
53 See LEMANN, supra note 50, at 244–53; Toussaint Losier, The Rise and Fall of the
1969 Chicago Jobs Campaign, 49 U. MEM. L. REV. 101, 107 (2018). It is important to note
the considerable policy and scholarly debate over defining a “gang.” Gangs in Chicago date
back as early as the 1920s. See generally Binder & Eghigian, supra note 9. While some
define gangs by their criminal behavior, the term has been applied in broad and often
discriminatory ways. For example, many youth gangs on the West and South Sides
emerged in the late ’50s as social movements and were deemed gangs more for their political stances than for their criminal behavior. More recently, journalists and researchers
have found that the CPD’s “gang database” includes many non–gang members. See, e.g.,
47
48
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The 1960s homicide wave was the first wave during which
the CPD used comprehensive data on homicides and other crimes
to legitimize its requests for more city, state, and federal funding.
After being appointed by Daley in 1960, police superintendent
O.W. Wilson, the former dean of the Berkeley School of Criminology and president of the American Society of Criminology, led an
effort to more comprehensively incorporate data into department
policy decisions. 54
Beginning in 1963, the CPD began tracking crime annually,
in thirteen four-week periods, and consistently publicized statistics on major crimes along with comments to the press. The department defined major crimes as murder, rape, serious assault,
robbery, burglary, theft over $50, and car theft. The CPD frequently referred to these as index crimes and combined them to
form one crime statistic. 55 These periodic department reports
were always well covered in the press, with the statistical tables
themselves comparing current and previous years. 56 It is crucial
to note that the comparisons between years were for the total
number of crimes, not population-adjusted crime rates. 57
Although the CPD began reporting that data in 1963, the
CPD did not comment much on homicide when the homicide rate
began trending upward in 1965. In media coverage throughout
1966, the CPD gave little attention to the almost-consistent
Annie Sweeny, Massive Gang Database Kept by Chicago Police Under Fire as Inaccurate,
Outdated, CHI. TRIB. (April 30, 2018), https://perma.cc/BEF5-LN98; JOHN HAGEDORN,
ROBERTO ASPHOLM, TERESA CÓRDOVA, ANDREW PAPACHRISTOS & LANCE WILLIAMS, THE
FRACTURING OF GANGS AND VIOLENCE IN CHICAGO 12 (2019); see also BALTO, supra
note 41, at 176–79; ANDREW J. DIAMOND, MEAN STREETS: CHICAGO YOUTHS AND THE EVERYDAY STRUGGLE FOR EMPOWERMENT IN THE MULTIRACIAL CITY, 1908-1969, at 276–77 (2009).
54 BALTO, supra note 41, at 154, 162–64; see WILLIAM J. BOPP, O. W.: O. W. WILSON
AND THE SEARCH FOR A POLICE PROFESSION 98–99 (1977). Although, it is worth mentioning
that the department had been plagued by past scandals surrounding underreporting and
generally inaccurate reporting of all crimes, homicide included, as recently as 1958. See
Max Sanderby & Bruce Taylor, Fake Records Hamper Police Expansion, Crime Expert
Says, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Dec. 19, 1958, at 7; Findings Surprise Daley, O’Connor, CHI. SUNTIMES, Dec. 7, 1958, at 3.
55 See Police Tell of Increase in Major Crimes, CHI. TRIB., May 16, 1964, at A1.
56 A complete list of reporting on crime reports would be too long. For some examples,
see ‘Major Crime Totals Rose in May’: Conlisk, CHI. TRIB., June 14, 1969, at N20; Crime
in City Rises 30 Pct. in Last Month, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 13, 1967, at A10; Chi.’s Crime Rate
Down 12% Wilson Reports, CHI. DAILY DEF., Jan. 13, 1966, at 4; Crime Down 13.1 Per
Cent, Wilson Says: Preventive Patrols Are Given Credit, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 18, 1964, at 10;
and City Crime Statistics, CHI. TRIB., May 5, 1965, at G11. Generally, the Chicago Tribune
published these reports every four weeks, along with annual reports at the start of the
new year.
57 See, e.g., Crime in City Rises 30 Pct. in Last Month, supra note 56.
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increase in homicides during each four-week period compared to
the previous year. Instead, city officials focused on the fact that
major crimes were trending downward overall. 58 When interviewed by the Chicago Tribune in February 1965, Wilson was
asked if he had any plans to address an uptick in “street crimes,”
like the recent murder of a sixty-six-year-old man by three teenagers. 59 He said that there would be no new response, just further
reliance on his strategy of “preventive patrol.” 60 In practice, Wilson’s strategy of “aggressive preventive patrol” in “high-crime” areas only resulted in increased policing of non-White areas and
more arrests for nonserious offenses, creating a self-perpetuating
cycle. 61
As homicide rates continued increasing in 1965, the CPD
blamed the increase on extreme weather or just argued that the
problem was beyond their control. In the summer of 1964, Wilson
told the press that, for the sixth police period in a row, “we have
enjoyed a decrease” in crime, despite the fact that homicides were
up in that year to date. 62 In late July and early August, when
homicides for that four-week period increased from twenty-three
people in 1964 to fifty people in 1965, Wilson blamed it on “hot
weather, and a lot of people getting mad at each other.” 63 At the
end of the year, Wilson praised the CPD for driving the overall
rate of crime down while dismissing the homicide increase because he claimed that it, along with rape, was the hardest crime
to control with patrolling. 64
City hall was similarly silent about the uptick in homicide.
During the summer of 1966, when homicides spiked again—including an increase from fifty in the summer of 1965 to seventytwo in the summer of 1966—the CPD again blamed it on the

58 See, e.g., Serious Crime Drops 20 Pct., Police Report: Only Homicides Go up in 28
Days, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 16, 1964, at C17; Wilson Reports Another Drop in City’s Crime, CHI.
TRIB., Sept. 28, 1964, at 4.
59 Clay Gowran, Wilson Tells Views on Crime, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 6, 1965, at 2.
60 Id.
61 See BALTO, supra note 41, at 159–93; Wilson Cites Decrease in Total Crimes: But
Rises in Specific Types Are Reported, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 27, 1964, at A3.
62 Compare Wilson Cites Decrease in Total Crimes: But Rises in Specific Types Are
Reported, supra note 61, with Major Crimes Decline Here; Reverse Trend: Only Rapes Increase in 28-Day Period, CHI. TRIB., June 3, 1965.
63 Homicides up, O. W. Blames It on Heat, CHI. DAILY DEF., Aug. 28, 1965, at 36.
64 Chicago’s Crime Rate Down 12% Wilson Reports, CHI. DAILY DEF., Jan. 13, 1966,
at 4; see also Wilson Tells of Decline in City’s Crimes, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 12, 1966, at B10.
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summer heat. 65 Homicide division commander Francis Flanagan
proffered the notion that “[p]eople become irritable, more easily
aggravated in hot weather” as an explanation. 66 The one exception was gang-related violence on the South and West Sides. After
an uptick in gang-related homicides that summer, the CPD
helped engineer a truce between two gangs and increased patrols
and surveillance there. 67 In these early years of the homicide
wave, the CPD and Daley centered their narrative about the homicide increase on meteorology.
Things changed abruptly at the end of the summer of 1966,
when Daley and Wilson pivoted to blaming the homicide increase
on civil rights protests. Although the struggle for racial justice in
Chicago did not begin just then, Chicago was in national headlines that summer for civil rights protests led by Martin Luther
King Jr., who threatened more marches and civil disobedience if
the Daley administration did not move faster on issues of racial
justice. Earlier in the summer, the marches put Daley in an awkward position. Large swaths of Daley’s White supporters vehemently and violently opposed the movement and its demands, but
Daley could not afford to publicly denounce the movement because of its importance to the Democratic Party nationally. 68
Wilson also frequently complained that the movement’s marches
into White neighborhoods could “trigger a race riot,” 69 since White
residents would frequently riot and attack the marchers, often
aided by police indifference. 70
When crime statistics for mid-August 1966 showed a 25% increase in crime totals from the previous year, Wilson and Daley
shifted their narrative about homicide beyond meteorology to
the civil rights marches, claiming that they were diverting police
officers from their normal duties, thus letting crime skyrocket.71
Three days later, the city government quickly obtained an injunction in court to block future demonstrations on the grounds of
July a Month of Murders—72 in Chicago: Exceeds Old Record by 22 Deaths, CHI.
TRIB., Aug. 2, 1966, at 5.
66 Id.
67 See Cops Will Get Longer Hours to Curb Teens, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 6, 1966, at B16.
68 See BALTO, supra note 41, at 185–86.
69 Donald Mosby & Arnold Rosenzweig, O.W. Warns Demonstrators in White Areas:
Ogilvie Seeks Anti-march Injunction, CHI. DAILY DEF., Aug. 10, 1966, at 3.
70 BALTO, supra note 41, at 106–15.
71 See, e.g., Crime Rates up Again, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 22, 1966, at 24; O.W. Tells Why
Crime Is up 25%, CHI. DAILY DEF., Aug. 24, 1966, at 3; Marches Hurt Crime Fight, Says
Wilson: Cites Rise in Serious Offenses, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 24, 1966, at 12; Rights Pickets Have
a Frustrating Day: Crime Rises 25 Pct., CHI. TRIB., Aug. 17, 1966, at 1.
65
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Wilson’s assertion about crime. 72 That same day, Daley gave a televised address expressing his fear that further protests would result in the “collapse of law and order.” 73 When the marches died
down by November, Wilson was credited with the decrease in major crime, even though homicide was still up 69%. 74 By late November, Wilson appeared confident about the situation, testifying
before the city council that his department was “forecast[ing] a
reduction in crime next year.” 75
In January 1967, when the annual crime-statistics report
showed that homicides increased by more than one hundred from
1965, Wilson again blamed the high numbers on the summer: “I
can only conclude that these disturbances engender an attitude
that is in some way conducive to criminal behavior, and that this
attitude persists for some time after the disturbances have
ended.” 76 As the year wore on, Wilson and Daley began to more
firmly frame the homicide wave as being driven by factors like
gangs and easy access to firearms. Prior to the homicide wave,
Daley and Wilson had framed access to firearms as a problem. In
1965, Daley unsuccessfully pushed for the Illinois state legislature to pass a slate of crime bills that would increase punishments
for a variety of offenses, expand police wiretapping powers, and
require new licensing and registration requirements to own a
firearm. 77
Back then, however, Wilson justified the push for gun control
and expanded police power as necessary for combatting all crimes
committed with firearms. 78 In 1967, Wilson and Daley began
framing gun-control measures as needed to specifically address
the homicide wave. They showed the state legislature data indicating that 257 of the 512 murders in 1966 were committed with
firearms, a drastic increase from the previous year. 79 Wilson continually emphasized that murders committed by young people
72 See Demands Order; Tells Why He Asked to Enjoin Marchers: Judge Restricts
Number, Hours of Protests, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 20, 1966, at A1.
73 Daley Makes Plea to City: ‘‘Must Protect Rights of Everyone’’, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 20,
1966, at A1.
74 Major Crimes Decline in City, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 16, 1966, at C4.
75 Edward Schreiber, Wilson Urges Wire Tapping: Appears Before Council Unit on
Budget, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 23, 1966, at 3.
76 City Crime up 4.8 Pct. in ’66, Says Wilson, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 11, 1967, at B9.
77 See George Tagge, Illinois Legislature Pushes Flurry of Anti-crime Bills, CHI.
TRIB., Apr. 4, 1965, at 4; see also Robert Howard, G.O.P. Begins Remap Fight: Holds Up
Vital Bills in Bid for Fair Law, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 18, 1965, at 1.
78 See Gowran, supra note 60.
79 Try Again for State Law to Register All Guns, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 23, 1967, at 7.
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under twenty-one had doubled from 1965 to 1966 and specifically
laid the blame on places like “the 3d district, Grand Crossing—
the Mecca of the Blackstone Rangers,” which had seen dramatic
increases in homicides committed with firearms. 80 He also lobbied
for stop-and-frisk legislation to expand the police’s power to seize
guns from those deemed unfit to possess them. 81 Stop-and-frisk
was not a new policy; Wilson had been advocating for it since
nearly the beginning of his tenure, in 1960. 82 Indeed, the policies
that Wilson and Daley advocated were not new but merely reframed policy agendas.
As homicide rates continued to increase in the summer of
1967, Wilson abruptly resigned from his position, and Daley appointed James Conlisk in his place. 83 Under Conlisk’s leadership,
the CPD’s punitive approach only increased as the GIU was rapidly scaled up and surveillance of Black neighborhoods skyrocketed. 84 Daley and Conlisk continued to attribute the growing homicide rate to gang violence. 85 While Daley continued to vow to
return law and order to the city, Conlisk oversaw the rapid
growth of the GIU from thirty-eight officers in 1967 to two hundred in 1968. 86 The GIU quickly gained a reputation for brutal
and violent tactics, with numerous allegations that they tortured
or threatened Black youth with being dropped off in hostile gang
territory if they refused to cooperate. 87
The police presence and surveillance of Black communities
surged as the CPD’s powers and numbers grew. Wilson and Daley’s earlier lobbying was now successful. Illinois passed a stopand-frisk law, giving officers legal cover to stop and search anyone
they deemed suspicious. 88 This, predictably, only furthered the
massive disparity in Black arrests and White arrests. By 1968,
the total number of Black arrests outnumbered White arrests by

Daley Asks Gun Law Support, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 7, 1967, at B2.
See Daley Favors “Stop-Frisk” Law Passage, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 9, 1967, at 9.
82 BALTO, supra note 41, at 158–62.
83 Id. at 187, 195.
84 Id. at 203–04.
85 Id. at 194–204.
86 Donald Mosby, Name 9th Black Police Captain: Ed Buckney to Beef Up Gang Unit,
CHI. DAILY DEF., Nov. 9, 1968, at 1.
87 See ELIZABETH DALE, ROBERT NIXON AND POLICE TORTURE IN CHICAGO, 1871–
1971, at 117–20 (2016); see also BALTO, supra note 41, at 201–02. See generally LAURENCE
RALPH, THE TORTURE LETTERS: RECKONING WITH POLICE VIOLENCE (2020).
88 See Robert Howard, Stop, Frisk Law Signed by Shapiro, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 22, 1968,
at 9
80
81
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30%, and the gap only continued to grow. 89 For many young Black
men, being stopped and harassed by the police was a fixture of
everyday life. 90
Despite the proliferation of the GIU and ever-expansive and
ever-aggressive police presence in Black communities, little evidence suggests that these tactics stopped the homicide wave. Daley
and Conlisk continued to blame gangs and access to firearms, and
in 1969 they formally declared a “war on gangs” in conjunction
with local state’s attorney Ed Hanrahan. 91 Hanrahan and Conlisk
quickly worked to scale up the GIU’s powers even more, leading
Atlantic writer James Alan McPherson to describe it as a “parapolitical force” due to the officers’ power over and connections
with the local jail, court, and state attorney’s office. 92 The GIU
used these powers to step up surveillance, harassment, and arrests
of anyone they suspected of being involved with gang activity, including the Black Panthers and other radical Black groups. 93
The CPD’s response to the 1966–1970 homicide wave relied
on the misuse of data to frame the homicide problem as stemming
from civil rights protests and to lobby state and federal government
for additional policing resources. The CPD consistently called for
more policing and undermined social-structural explanations for
the uptick in homicide. The success of the CPD’s response to the
1966–1970 wave was most evident by the city’s shifting budget.
As city hall refrained from making greater investments in education and other vital social services, it spent significantly more
on policing such that, by the mid-1970s, the police represented
about a quarter of Chicago’s annual budget. 94
C. Guns, Gangs, the Feds, and More Police, 1987–1992
The 1987–1992 homicide wave struck the community areas
of Grand Boulevard, the Near South Side, and Washington
Park—all on Chicago’s South Side, and all predominantly Black.
Grand Boulevard was 99% Black, with 64% of the population

BALTO, supra note 41, at 199.
Id. at 200.
91 Id. at 203; see also Mayor Calls Parley Today on Violence, CHI. TRIB., May 26, 1969,
at C11; Joseph Boyce & William Jones, Street Gangs Are Becoming a Power Bloc, CHI.
TRIB., June 16, 1969, at 1.
92 James Alan McPherson, Chicago’s Blackstone Rangers (II), THE ATLANTIC (June
1969), https://perma.cc/HRJ9-BBXM.
93 BALTO, supra note 41, at 201–02.
94 Id. at 246.
89
90
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living below the poverty line. 95 The Near South Side was 94%
Black, with 61% below the poverty line and a quarter of its labor
force unemployed. 96 Washington Park was 99% Black, with 57%
below the poverty line. 97 These areas were known for deteriorating housing with vacant lots, abandoned buildings, and no new
private construction. 98

Although homicide rates started increasing in 1987, the city
did not begin treating it as a crisis until 1990. In 1988 and 1989,
city officials were actually touting the homicide totals as low
95 Christopher R. Reed & Annie Ruth Leslie, CA38—Grand Boulevard, in LOCAL
COMMUNITY FACT BOOK: CHICAGO METROPOLITAN AREA 1990, supra note 12, at 129, 130.
96 Dennis McClendon, CA33—Near South Side, in LOCAL COMMUNITY FACT BOOK:
CHICAGO METROPOLITAN AREA 1990, supra note 12, at 118, 119.
97 Staff, CA40—Washington Park, in LOCAL COMMUNITY FACT BOOK: CHICAGO METROPOLITAN AREA 1990, supra note 12, at 134, 135.
98 McClendon, supra note 96, at 118; Reed & Leslie, supra note 95, at 129; Staff,
supra note 97, at 134.
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relative to the past twenty years. 99 Homicides were still acknowledged as an issue, but they were usually framed as being a specific problem related to gangs 100 and public housing 101 or as a problem for only a few neighborhoods. 102 Before the homicide wave,
the city had experimented with nonpunitive violence-prevention
strategies to stem gang-related homicides. Under Mayor Harold
Washington, Chicago’s first Black mayor, the city launched the
Chicago Intervention Network (CIN) to reduce gang violence.103
After the widely publicized death of high-school basketball star
Ben Wilson in 1984, the CIN was created to “keep track of street
gang trouble,” “mediate disputes,” and “steer youngsters from
gangs.” 104 Initially seeded with $750,000 in funding from the city
in 1985, the program included a mental-health emergency hotline
and nine field officers who worked with former gang members
to prevent homicides. 105 While the CIN did not strictly rely on
punitive measures to combat homicides, it did not avoid them
either. The program’s work was still deeply embedded within the
criminal justice system. “[R]epresentatives from the [CPD],
courts, probation agencies, the Cook County state’s attorney and
the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services” sat on
a law-enforcement committee that worked with the program. 106
99 See Murder Rate Lowest in 20 Years, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 14, 1989, at 3; William
Recktenwald & Robert Blau, Chicago Bucking the Trend in Big-City Slayings, CHI. TRIB.,
Jan. 8, 1989, at C1.
100 See, e.g., Nathaniel Sheppard Jr. & William Recktenwald, New Upsurge in Street
Gangs, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 8, 1984, at 1; William Recktenwald & Nathaniel Sheppard Jr.,
Spread of Gangs Defies Police Efforts, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 11, 1984, at 1; William Recktenwald
& Nathaniel Sheppard Jr., Two Cops, Looking for Trouble: Gang Crimes Unit Keeps Close
Watch on Neighborhoods, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 11, 1984, at C8; Marianne Taylor, Street Patrols
Proposed to Fight Gang Violence, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 5, 1984, at B6; El Rukn Leader Sought
in Murder of 3, CHI. METRO NEWS, May 4, 1985; Laurie Abraham, Study Links Gangs,
Killings of Hispanics, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 28, 1986, at 24; Clarence Page, Why We’re
Losing War on Gangs, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 17, 1986, at D3.
101 See, e.g., Jerry Thornton & George E. Curry, Trapped in CHA Projects, CHI. TRIB.,
Jan. 15, 1984, at 1; William Mullen, The Road to Hell: For Cabrini Green, It Was Paved
with Good Intentions, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 31, 1985, at H11; Patrick Reardon, CHA Violent
Crime up 9% for Year, CHI. TRIB., June 22, 1988, at 1.
102 See, e.g., Patrick Reardon, Suburb Crime Dips for 3d Year in Row, CHI. TRIB., June
3, 1984, at 1; William Recktenwald & Manuel Galvan, Near Northwest Side Slayings Soar,
CHI. TRIB., July 29, 1984, at 1; Laura Kavesh, Gang Tactics: U. of C. Ambassadors Cruise
Streets for Peace, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 9, 1984, at D1; Lynn Emmerman, City’s Mean Streets
Grow Meaner for Dealers, CHI. TRIB., May 19, 1985, at A1.
103 Hanke Gratteau & William Recktenwald, Mayor Aims More Cash at Fight Against
Gangs, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 8, 1985, at A1.
104 Id.
105 See id.; Approve the Gang Program, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 16, 1985, at 12.
106 Approve the Gang Program, supra note 105.
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Initially, Washington praised the program as a success in
fighting crime, proffering a decrease in gang-related homicides
and the 38% decline in the youth-murder rate from 1984 to 1985
as evidence. 107 In 1986, the city’s budget allocated $4.8 million to
the Department of Human Services (which administered the
CIN)—an almost $2 million increase from 1985. 108 The program
soon came under scrutiny in 1986 and 1987—especially during
the 1987 city elections—for failing to stop an increase in gangrelated homicides. 109 Still, Washington vowed to press on and invest more in the program in 1987 to hire more workers, declaring
that “after one year . . . we are on the right track.” 110 Nevertheless,
in terms of pure financial investment, the budget for the CIN and
the Department of Human Services consistently paled in comparison to the CPD, whose annual appropriations were always in the
hundreds of millions of dollars by that point. 111
When the homicide wave began in 1987, the CPD was lauding
its homicide-reduction strategies of seizing guns and conducting
more arrests. At the end of 1987, top CPD officials credited the
seizure of guns for limiting homicides that year. 112 In the summer
of 1988, “Chief of Detectives Edward Wodnicki credited the Police
Department’s fight against narcotics and gangs for the decreased
homicide rate.” 113 CPD superintendent LeRoy Martin especially
touted the homicide totals for 1987 as being among the lowest in
the past twenty years, neglecting the fact that Chicago had half a
million more residents in 1968. 114 Martin credited the relatively
107 Mayor Says Gang Crimes Down, CHI. METRO NEWS, Jan. 25, 1986; Harry Golden
Jr., Anti-gang Push Works, Says Mayor, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 21, 1986, at 8; Winning the
War on Gangs, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 6, 1986, at 12; cf. Judith Walker, Opinion, City Defends Its
Anti-gang Effort, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 22, 1986, at 26.
108 Compare CITY OF CHI., ANNUAL APPROPRIATION ORDINANCE FOR THE YEAR 1986,
at IV (1986), with CITY OF CHI., ANNUAL APPROPRIATION ORDINANCE FOR THE YEAR 1985,
at IV (1985). See also Page, supra note 102.
109 See Ray Hanania, Mayoralty Dominates Ward Races, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 12,
1987, at 10; Anne Keegan & Jerry Thornton, Gang Plan Defended by Mayor, CHI. TRIB.,
Aug. 1, 1986, at A3.
110 Keegan & Thornton, supra note 109 (quoting Mayor Washington).
111 See, e.g., CITY OF CHI., ANNUAL APPROPRIATION ORDINANCE FOR THE YEAR 1987,
at IV (1987); CITY OF CHI., ANNUAL APPROPRIATION ORDINANCE FOR THE YEAR 1988, at IV
(1988); CITY OF CHI., ANNUAL APPROPRIATION ORDINANCE FOR THE YEAR 1989, at IV (1989)
[hereinafter 1989 ANNUAL APPROPRIATION ORDINANCE].
112 William Recktenwald, City Homicides Drop in ’87: Gun Deaths Are Lowest in 19
Years, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 2, 1988, at 1.
113 Robert Blau & William Recktenwald, Homicides with Guns Drop to a 20-Year Low,
CHI. TRIB., July 14, 1988, at A3.
114 Cf. Patrick Reardon, City About Equal in Terms of Race, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 23,
1986), https://perma.cc/TF74-VA6T.
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low total that year to increased gun seizures by the CPD, especially an “accelerated program of gun seizures” after a federal
court ordered the release of thousands of prisoners from Cook
County Jail that summer because of squalid conditions. 115 In
January 1989, Martin said that his main concern going forward
was thefts, making no mention of homicides. 116
That year also brought a change in the mayoral administration.
After Washington’s sudden passing in November 1987, Eugene
Sawyer led as interim mayor until April 1989, when Richard M.
Daley (son of former mayor Richard J. Daley) began his twentytwo-year stint in the mayor’s office. 117 Daley had formerly served
as the Cook County state’s attorney, where he supported the same
punitive policies to fight crime that he would support as mayor.118
For example, even before serving as mayor, he had railed against
the federal government for failing to stop the flow of drugs—like
crack cocaine—into the country and frequently called for life in
prison without parole for individuals caught smuggling more than
five pounds of drugs or laundering over $100,000. 119 As mayor,
Daley declined to make any new investments in even the moderate,
nonpunitive strategies of Washington’s administration. Instead,
he returned to the playbook from the 1960s, calling for increasing
funding for the police and working in lockstep with the new state’s
attorney, the U.S. attorney, and the CPD to push punitive policies
in response to the increasing homicide rate.
Later in 1989, the CPD acknowledged a dramatic increase in
drug-related homicides and an increase in homicides overall. But
when asked about the total number of homicides in July, Martin
argued that many of those were “not homicides we could have prevented” because they stemmed from domestic disputes or drugs. 120
115 Recktenwald & Blau, supra note 99; see also Ron Grossman, Chicago Flashback:
Lockup Has Seen Worse Days, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 22, 2013, at 23; Tom Brune & Jim Casey,
Safety First: Chicagoans’ No. 1 Problem, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 29, 1989, at 4.
116 Jim Casey, Crime Surge Prompts Cop District Shakeups, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 17,
1989, at 18.
117 MERRINER, supra note 21, at 238–39.
118 Cf. Daley Lectures Lawmen on Drugs, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 8, 1986, at 21; Richard M. Daley, Opinion, Cook County Prosecutors Deserve Pay Raise, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan.
31, 1986, at 32.
119 See John Kass, U.S. Lost Drug War, Daley Says in Urging Military Role, CHI.
TRIB., Apr. 20, 1991, at N5; Ray Hanania, Daley Rallies Kids, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Oct. 25,
1989, at 3.
120 Flynn McRoberts, Homicides in Chicago Jump 31%, CHI. TRIB., July 14, 1989, at
N6; cf. Robert Blau, Drug-Related Slayings on the Rise in City, Police Records Show, CHI.
TRIB., Apr. 3, 1989, at N2.
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Still, in October of that year, Daley promised to expand the focus
of the CIN to thirty high schools in the city to promote anti-gang
and antidrug initiatives. 121 As the homicide wave continued to
grow, Daley did not deliver on that promise. 122 At the end of the
year, when reflecting on the higher homicide total, the chief of
detectives blamed it on access to guns and advocated for tougher
gun-control legislation. 123
In 1990, the homicide total continued to grow until it spiraled
into a full-on crisis for the city. 124 The CPD initially responded by
stepping up patrols and policing in “gang-infested” areas to seize
more guns and make more arrests; the CPD also lobbied the state
government for more punitive laws. 125 Still, homicides continued
to increase. In June 1990, a member of the Chicago Crime Commission called for the city council to hold a summit on the violence. 126
At the “murder summit” hearings held by the city council in September, Daley vowed to hire more police officers to address the
crisis. 127 When Alderman Timothy Evans, a Black alderman representing the Fourth Ward, asked Daley about creating more jobs
programs for underprivileged youth, Daley demurred and instead
pitched his plan for a third airport to be built in the city. 128
This comment was quite representative of Daley’s approach
to community-based violence-prevention strategies. Daley spoke

Hanania, supra note 119.
The city’s budgets reveal that the initiatives’ funding declined. Compare CITY OF
CHI., ANNUAL APPROPRIATION ORDINANCE FOR THE YEAR 1990, at 140 (1990) [hereinafter
1990 ANNUAL APPROPRIATION ORDINANCE], with 1989 ANNUAL APPROPRIATION ORDINANCE, supra note 111, at 134.
123 See Phillip J. O’Connor, City Homicides up 12% in ’89, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 3,
1990, at 51; see also William Recktenwald & Robert Blau, Youth Homicides up 22% in
City: Gangs and Drugs Blamed for Rise in Murder Rate, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 27, 1990, at C1;
William Recktenwald & Robert Blau, Chi. Killings up 12% in ’89, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 2, 1990,
at N1.
124 See Jim Casey & Phillip J. O’Connor, Murder Report: Guns, Kids Are a Deadly
Mix, CHI. SUN-TIMES, May 23, 1990, at 4; Robert Blau & William Recktenwald, Child
Homicides Soar in City and Suburbs, CHI. TRIB., May 20, 1990, at C1.
125 William Recktenwald, 3 Die Despite Police Push Against Gangs, CHI. TRIB., June
11, 1990, at N_A1; see also Fran Spielman, Tough Crime Bill Signed—Wave of Killings
Here Cited, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Sept. 11, 1990, at 8; Police Arrest 125 in Crackdown in Area
Ripped by Gang Violence, CHI. TRIB., June 12, 1990, at D7C.
126 Jim Casey & Phillip J. O’Connor, Increase in Slayings Brings Call for Summit on
Crime, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 18, 1990, at 15.
127 Robert Davis & John Kass, Aldermen Probe Rise in Killings, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 26,
1990), https://perma.cc/2QQ3-H543; see also Robert Davis, Daley’s Politics Could Leave
Hole in Budget, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 14, 1990, at C3A.
128 Robert Davis, Crossfire of Words Rakes Crime Talks, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 27, 1990, at
S1.
121
122
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about local involvement and opportunities for underprivileged
youth, yet these ideas never materialized in his budgets during
the homicide wave. For example, the city’s investment in the CIN
remained flat, and it was eventually defunded entirely in 1993.129
Further, the Daley administration never invested in philanthropist-funded, community-based violence-prevention strategies
that were designed, implemented, and evaluated by Irving Spergel, a University of Chicago professor of social work. 130 When the
media pressed Daley on the ever-increasing homicides in the runup to the 1991 mayoral election, he doubled down on his prior
strategies. Like his father before him, Daley emphasized a lawand-order approach and pledged to hire more police officers. 131 After the 1992 election, community policing entered the policy
agenda, with Daley and Martin expressing interest in testing it.132
By the end of 1992, however, Chicago had only an experimental
pilot program, and further expansions of community policing occurred long after the homicide wave ended. 133
As the homicide wave worsened, Daley grew increasingly
frustrated with the situation and media coverage of his administration’s failed policies. At one point, he exclaimed that Chicago was “becoming like Colombia” 134 and blamed the federal
government for having “lost this so-called war” on drugs. 135 Daley
also placed cultural blame on the communities suffering from the
violence, arguing that the “permissive society of 20 years ago”

129 See Fran Spielman, City Budget Cuts Safety, Anti-gang Programs, CHI. SUNTIMES, Nov. 18, 1992, at 15; CITY OF CHI., ANNUAL APPROPRIATION ORDINANCE FOR THE
YEAR 1992, at 135 (1992); CITY OF CHI., ANNUAL APPROPRIATION ORDINANCE FOR THE YEAR
1991, at 145 (1991); 1990 ANNUAL APPROPRIATION ORDINANCE, supra note 122, at 140.
130 See Kavesh, supra note 102; IRVING A. SPERGEL, REDUCING YOUTH GANG VIOLENCE
27–78 (2007).
131 See John Kass & Teresa Wiltz, Hispanic Leaders Ask Daley: Where Are the 600
Cops?, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 1, 1991, at N1.
132 See Daley Program to Put Police in Closer Contact with People, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 2,
1993, at D_B7; Charles Nicodemus, Martin, Mayor Back ‘Community Policing’, CHI. SUNTIMES, Jan. 30, 1992, at 14; Cops and Communities Take On Crime, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 19,
1992, at L22; Phillip J. O’Connor, 33-Year Veteran Says Time Is Right for Change, CHI.
SUN-TIMES, Apr. 14, 1992, at 3; Don Hayner, ‘Community Policing’ Scores Points, CHI.
SUN-TIMES, Apr. 2, 1992; William Recktenwald, Groups Aim for Changes in Policing, CHI.
TRIB., July 8, 1991, at 1.
133 Cf. RICHARD M. DALEY & MATT L. RODRIGUEZ, TOGETHER WE CAN: A STRATEGIC
PLAN FOR REINVENTING THE CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT (1993) (showing that community policing was still in the planning stage by October 1993).
134 John Kass, Daley Revises City, Bogota Comparison, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 31, 1991, at S5.
135 Kass, supra note 119.
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created the perpetrators of the present. 136 Daley said, “Remember
the stories about the social workers complaining, ‘you’re picking
on the poor kids?’ Now what they are, they’re 40-year-old gangbangers running narcotics, and they’re not afraid of me or anybody else.” 137 With these veiled references to the Civil Rights
Movement and War on Poverty, Daley blamed the homicide wave
on communities not being tough enough on poor kids, who he believed grew up to become the gang leaders driving the homicide
wave.
Martin echoed Daley’s responses to the media. After a visit to
China in 1991, Martin declared, “We need to take a look at [the
Constitution] and maybe from time to time we should curtail
some of those rights”; he praised China for executing drug dealers
by firing squad, in contrast to Chicago, where “[w]e give drug
dealers I-bonds [ ], and what do they do? They go back out and
sell more drugs.” 138
D. Mentoring and More Police Expansion, 2016
The 2016 homicide wave saw the highest homicide rate increase of any year in Chicago history, with a total of 762 murders in the city, a roughly 60% increase from 2015 and the most
homicides in Chicago in nineteen years. 139 The Fuller Park and
Englewood community areas bore the brunt of this homicide
spike. Fuller Park’s homicide rate peaked at 2.050, and Englewood
was close behind at 1.914. Fuller Park and Englewood, adjacent
South Side neighborhoods, had similar characteristics. Englewood
was 95% Black, with 55% making less than $25,000 and 26% unemployed. 140 In comparison, 90% of Fuller Park’s residents were
Black, with 55% making less than $25,000 and 24% unemployed.141

136 John Kass & William Recktenwald, Daley: City ‘Becoming Like Colombia’, CHI.
TRIB., Aug. 30, 1991, at N1.
137 Id.
138 Robert Blau & William Recktenwald, Let’s Fight Crime as Chinese Do, Martin
Says, CHI. TRIB., July 12, 1991, at NW1. An I-bond—or investment bond—is “a type of
savings bond from the US Treasury that pays a fixed rate of interest, plus interest at a
rate that changes every six months based on the rate of inflation.” I Bond, CAMBRIDGE
ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://perma.cc/98RS-GPRD.
139 City of Chi., supra note 7.
140 CHI. METRO. AGENCY FOR PLAN., ENGLEWOOD: COMMUNITY DATA SNAPSHOT 3, 5,
9 (2021).
141 CHI. METRO. AGENCY FOR PLAN., FULLER PARK: COMMUNITY DATA SNAPSHOT 3, 5,
9 (2021).
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FIGURE 5: CHOROPLETH MAP OF CHICAGO IN 2016,
ILLUSTRATING THE PERCENTILE RANGE OF
HOMICIDE RATES IN EACH COMMUNITY AREA

Like it was during previous homicide waves, Chicago in 2016
was enmeshed in deep social and political upheaval. The 2014
killing of Black teenager Laquan McDonald sparked citywide protests and brought renewed scrutiny on law enforcement and city
management. 142 The killing also propelled the CPD into the national spotlight, resulting in the Department of Justice launching
an investigation that found that the CPD engaged in a “pattern
or practice of unconstitutional policing.” 143 These events strained
police-community relations, which Emanuel acknowledged:
“Fighting crime requires a partnership between the police and the
community, and we all know that this partnership has been
tested in Chicago. It is a problem that has festered in our city for
142 Nausheen Husain, Laquan McDonald Timeline: The Shooting, the Video, the Verdict and the Sentencing, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 18, 2019), https://perma.cc/SJ6W-6CSX.
143 C.R. DIV. & U.S. ATT’Y’S OFF. N. DIST. OF ILL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., INVESTIGATION
OF THE CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT 1–11, 124 (2017).
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decades. The shooting of Laquan McDonald brought it to a breaking point.” 144
Early in 2016, both the mayor and law enforcement attributed the surge in homicides to increased public scrutiny of the
police from the Laquan McDonald shooting and the subsequent
civil rights investigation. 145 The fear of ending up in a viral video,
according to police leadership, simultaneously discouraged proactive policing and emboldened violent criminals. 146 The Emanuel
administration leveraged protests from social movements like
Black Lives Matter to suggest that protests made police work
more difficult. This was highlighted in police superintendent Eddie Johnson’s comments during a news conference, as summarized by the New York Times: “Chicago was among many American Cities where violence has surged, including attacks on police
officers. . . . [A]nger at the police has left criminals ‘emboldened’
to commit crimes.” 147 In a March 2016 speech, Emanuel ignored
the message of protestors seeking justice for Laquan McDonald
when he stated, “Members of the community want more officers
in their lives—not less. They want to know the name of the officer
and the officer should know the name of the community members
or the business owners. That is what we’re trying to establish.”148
In the summer of 2016, the Emanuel administration deployed four strategies to try to stem the homicide spike. The first
was to hire 619 more officers. 149 The second strategy was an expansion of a $50 million mentoring program called Get IN Chicago, which was started by Emanuel in 2013. 150 Funded by multiple private companies, Get IN Chicago was a mentoring program
based on former Illinois governor Pat Quinn’s Neighborhood Recovery Initiative. 151 Emanuel hired the former director of the
Neighborhood Recovery Initiative, Toni Irving, to supervise Get

144 Rahm Emanuel, Mayor of Chicago, Rahm Emanuel’s Speech on Chicago Violence
(Sept. 22, 2016), in DNAINFO, https://perma.cc/PS5G-KH5V.
145 See Fran Spielman, Emanuel Calls Soaring Homicides ‘Totally Unacceptable’, CHI.
SUN-TIMES (Mar. 2, 2016), https://perma.cc/TY93-E296.
146 Id.
147 The Associated Press, Chicago Ends Year with 762 Killings, the Most in 2 Decades,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2017), https://perma.cc/5ZRV-DF2R.
148 Spielman, supra note 145.
149 CHI. POLICE DEP’T, ANNUAL REPORT 2017, at 52 (2018), https://perma.cc/ELW2-LGAJ.
150 Lisa Bertagnoli, News Analysis, Six Reasons Get IN Chicago Didn’t Work, 40
CRAIN’S CHI. BUS., Feb. 6, 2017, at 3.
151 See Tony Arnold, Manager of Troubled Illinois Anti-Violence Program Now Running Similar Agency, WBEZ CHI. (May 7, 2014), https://perma.cc/7GL4-576E.
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IN Chicago. 152 Emanuel’s mentoring program was similar to social interventions of the 1960s but differed in that the 2016 jobs
program came from private donations to Emanuel’s organization
whereas, in the 1960s, the federal government allocated grants
for jobs directly to community-based organizations. 153 Get IN Chicago was also not a public charity with tax-exempt status. Rather,
it was a “donor-advised fund” housed at the Chicago Community
Trust, which meant that it could operate like its own private
foundation. 154
Emanuel’s appointment of Irving drew media scrutiny because, in 2014, Cook County state’s attorney Anita Alvarez called
for a criminal investigation into the Neighborhood Recovery Initiative for alleged financial wrongdoing. 155 Investigative reports
found that the mentoring programs consisted of paying youth
$8.75 an hour to distribute flyers with violence-prevention messages as well as to march with Quinn at the Bud Billiken Parade
during his reelection campaign. 156 Emanuel defended his hiring of
Irving by dismissing criticism as merely “cynical” politics. 157
Like the CPD’s responses to the waves in the 1960s and
1980s, Emanuel responded to the 2016 homicide wave by expanding violence-prevention strategies that were already in place.
Emanuel’s third strategy was to rebrand the Get IN Chicago mentoring program as “Mayor Emanuel’s Mentoring Initiative,”
which was framed as a universal mentoring program for Chicago
youth in the city’s twenty most-impoverished and violencestricken neighborhoods. 158 The mayor’s supposedly new initiative
was to last three years and include funding from public and private sources, such as Exelon, Uber, and People’s Gas. 159 Citing
research conducted by the University of Chicago Crime Lab, the
mayor’s office stated in a press release:
152
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154 THE CHI. CMTY. TR., 2015 ANNUAL REPORT 85 (2016); Donor-Advised Funds, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (last updated Sept. 7, 2021), https://perma.cc/EYH8-7637.
155 How Quinn’s Anti-violence Program Spiraled Out of Control, NBC 5 CHI. (May 1,
2014), https://perma.cc/T84C-PVN9.
156 Scott Zamost, Drew Griffin & Elizabeth Nunez, Questions Surround $55 Million
Program to Cut Violence in Chicago, CNN (Dec. 3, 2012), https://perma.cc/NW8N-BLG8.
157 Arnold, supra note 151.
158 See OFF. OF THE MAYOR, CITY OF CHI., MAYOR EMANUEL OUTLINES COMPREHENSIVE PUBLIC SAFETY STRATEGY 1 (2016).
159 OFF. OF THE MAYOR, CITY OF CHI., MAYOR EMANUEL ANNOUNCES MENTORING INITIATIVE TO SERVE AN ADDITIONAL 2,000 YOUTH IN HIGHEST RISK COMMUNITIES THIS FALL
1–2 (2017).
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[M]entorship has been proven to be an effective strategy for
increasing high school graduation rates and reducing violence. In two randomized controlled trials, the Crime Lab
found that [its ‘Becoming a Man’] program cut[ ] violentcrime arrests among youth in half and boost[ed] the high
school graduation rates of participants by nearly 20 percent.160
While Emanuel deserves credit for being the first mayor to
pursue nonpunitive responses during a homicide wave, the enormous funding difference between his mentoring initiative
($36 million over three years) and the CPD budget ($4 billion over
three years) reveals that punitive responses were still the priority.
The fourth and final strategy deployed by law enforcement in
2016 was the Advancing Community Policing Initiative. 161 In conjunction with the mayor, law enforcement created the Community
Policing Advisory Panel (CPAP), consisting of law enforcement
experts, law enforcement, and community leaders. 162 CPAP’s
tasks were to gather input from a variety of stakeholders both
locally and nationwide to help put together policy recommendations for law enforcement in a year-end report. 163 It is unclear how
law enforcement implemented these recommendations, but its
creation was another example of the city continuing preexisting
violence-prevention strategies given that community policing was
first undertaken by Daley in the 1990s.
The city’s responses to homicide did not stop in 2016. In February 2017, the CPD created Strategic Decision Support Centers
(SDSCs) throughout the city. 164 SDSCs are technology centers
equipped with ShotSpotter equipment, live street-camera feeds,
a predictive-policing technology program named HunchLab, and
lab analysts. 165 The centers were staffed by law-enforcement officials and analysts in partnership with the University of Chicago’s
Crime Lab. 166 The shift to high-tech surveillance labs marked an
effort to integrate predictive-policing technology as a mainstay in
OFFICE OF THE MAYOR, CITY OF CHI., MAYOR EMANUEL’S FINAL BUDGET TO EX1 (2018).
161 CHI. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 149, at 8.
162 Id. at 5, 8.
163 See id. at 8–9.
164 See Shibani Mahtani, Chicago Tries High-Tech Approach to Curb Violence, WALL
ST. J. (May 12, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/chicago-tries-high-tech-approach-to
-curb-violence-1494581403; Joel Gunter, Chicago Goes High-Tech in Search of Answers to
Gun Crime Surge, BBC AM. (June 19, 2017), https://perma.cc/WGR9-SYWT.
165 Gunter, supra note 164.
166 Id.
160
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Chicago policing, following in the footsteps of the New York and
Los Angeles police departments. 167 Initially, the SDSCs were located in the Englewood and Harrison neighborhoods—the two
community areas with the highest rates of shootings. 168 According
to the Chicago Tribune, the SDSCs cost $1.5 million to outfit and
were funded through a combination of public and private
sources. 169 Studies conducted by RAND Corporation suggest that
the centers contributed to reductions in crime, but it remains unclear what brought the 2016 homicide wave to a halt. 170
Like in the 1960s and 1980s, the CPD in 2016 continued to
emphasize the need for more gun-control laws and tougher sentences for repeat gun offenders. 171 Johnson relayed this in an interview with PBS: “In Chicago we have a gun problem. We have
a very bad gun issue.” 172 He continued: “The violence in this city
is more about what the bad guys are doing and not so much about
what the police are or are not doing.” 173 Another 1,125 officers
were hired in 2017, almost a doubling from the number of officers
hired the year before. 174 Per the Chicago Sun-Times, this translated to more than 500 new patrol officers, 90 field training officers, more than 100 sergeants, 200 detectives, and more than
40 lieutenants. 175
Like the responses to homicide increases in the 1960s and
1980s, the city relied on data to frame and combat the 2016 homicide wave, but 2016 marked the first time that the city relied
heavily on partnerships with a private lab at the University of
Chicago to use data to legitimize its strategies.
Founded in 2008, the Crime Lab issued several reports prior
to 2016 that called for increasing the length of imprisonment for
people carrying firearms illegally. 176 Despite a report signed by
167
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thirty-two Chicago-area academics critiquing the lab’s position on
sentencing enhancements, the Crime Lab stood by its position. 177
Critics of the Crime Lab have noted how its research reports
have never reported ineffective or harmful CPD strategies. In a
conference on Chicago’s 2016 homicide spike, the Crime Lab
“wrote off explanations about social-service spending” and the release of video footage from the killing of Laquan McDonald. 178 The
Crime Lab’s data agreement with the CPD, which we acquired
through a Freedom of Information Act request, helps explain this
publication bias. It stipulates that, “with or without cause, CPD
retains the right to require the immediate return or destruction
of all copies of the information obtained under this Agreement . . .
and refuse any future requests for criminal information from the
Requestor.” 179 This stipulation amounts to a veiled threat, warning the researcher of the city’s monopoly over data and its power
to banish researchers from any future data access.
The use of data in response to the 2016 homicide wave illuminated an important evolution in how the city and the CPD used
data to capitalize on crises. Private labs operating with proprietary data agreements and little public oversight carry on the historical pattern of using data to discredit policing alternatives and
to continue centering police as the key providers of public
safety. 180

177 Wally Hilke, The Truth Limps After: Social Science and Advocacy in Chicago. Gun
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III. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Throughout Chicago history, city leaders have characterized
homicide and its causes as rooted in individual behavior and
Black neighborhoods while increasingly relying on data to legitimize these characterizations. This bounds policy debates about
violence prevention to debates aimed at changing individual behavior instead of expanding social services and economic opportunity. The city’s individualized framings of homicide evolved
from Black bootleggers in the 1920s and civil rights agitators in
the 1960s to gangs in the 1980s and unemployed, mentorless
Black youth in 2016. These framings have associated criminality
with Blackness and deflected attention away from the societal
conditions that give rise to violence. While the individualized
framing of homicide quickly withers under deeper social-scientific
scrutiny, it has nevertheless remained effective at helping the
police department legitimize itself and grow its budget after each
homicide wave.
The focus on individuals persists, despite recent mayors and
police superintendents using the language of “root causes” of violence in their speeches. City leaders now mention structural
problems like poverty, despair, lack of federal funding, and lack
of federal gun-control legislation. But they often do so only to
characterize these problems as beyond their control. And while
it’s true that the city is constrained by these structural problems,
the city still chooses to apply its limited resources to implement
ineffective strategies like tougher sentencing laws and longer injail holding periods for arrestees. 181 Even more troubling, universities and private philanthropists are reproducing the CPD’s individualistic homicide narrative while allowing the flaws in the
CPD’s policies and crime-data analyses to go uncontested. Recall,
for example, Martin’s comparison of the total number of Chicago
homicides in 1968 and 1988 without accounting for population
change. 182 Such egregious errors in the CPD’s crime-data analytics,
nevertheless, influence public opinion when they go uncontested
by mainstream media, philanthropists, and highly esteemed local
and national social-scientific crime experts.

181 See Patrick Smith, Mayor Lori Lightfoot Blamed Gun Violence on Judges, but
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https://perma.cc/P26B-363G.
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By controlling data access with the means to discipline researchers, the CPD can define the metrics of success or failure for
crime interventions that favor their organizational self-interest
over Chicago residents. Activists, community organizers, journalists, and academics seeking to contest the city’s narratives or
crime statistics are ignored or, ironically, labeled as biased and
incapable of objective evaluation. Recently, the CPD’s power to
monopolize and misuse data has been strengthened and protected
by the scientific legitimacy provided by the universities, labs, and
researchers with whom it selectively partners.
Another critical implication of these histories is the discovery
that Chicago emerged out of each homicide wave with (1) more
police officers, (2) more police-department funding, and (3) more
technologies for surveilling the same handful of low-income Black
communities. By deflecting responsibility for homicide onto external forces like Black social movements, guns, and the federal government, the CPD justified significant growth in its budget after
each wave.
The histories we shared are crucial for groups seeking to advance public-safety alternatives because institutionalizing any
new public-safety model will require resisting and ultimately dismantling the data monopoly that helps police capitalize on crisis.
One of the most important but difficult tasks for advancing alternatives to police is building new data infrastructures for measuring and analyzing public safety that are not collected, stored, or
gatekept by police. Victimization surveys serve as one potential
alternative, but they are expensive to implement. Alternatively,
smartphone applications, such as “Citizen,” allow residents to report crimes in their neighborhood in real time and for everyone to
see, but private companies are not compelled to share their data
with the public. More research and critical thinking are needed
to devise a system of data governance that would provide a more
democratic alternative to the mayor’s office and the CPD’s data
monopoly. Professor Aziz Huq’s research on the potential creation
of public trusts in data may help generate more democratic data
systems for urban governance. 183
Until such systems become a possibility, we implore people
to, at the very least, question the rationales that cities and law
enforcement use to characterize homicide waves. Anti-Black
183 See Aziz Z. Huq, The Public Trust in Data, 110 GEO L.J. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 40–58), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3794780.
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criminal stereotypes have proven effective at diverting public attention away from the institutional sources of violence. This persistent commitment to anti-Blackness has been difficult to disrupt, as it has historically translated to more funding, more
technology, and more boots on the ground for the police.
In conclusion, we hope that this Essay advances strategic efforts to institutionalize public-safety alternatives to policing.
Aside from focusing on homicide perpetrators and victims, we
urge Chicagoans to question who defines success or failure when
it comes to solving homicide in Chicago. Reflecting on this question reveals that tackling Chicago’s homicide problem requires
not only devising interventions targeting individuals but also inquiring into the organizational dynamics of race, state power, and
the production of legitimacy. Without more inquiry into the powerful—yet seemingly mundane—organizational and racialized
apparatuses that legitimize police, those with the most to lose
from social change will continue to monopolize influence over the
public’s imagination during crises.

